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Case No. 20110254 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Ricky Cunningham, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order dismissing a petition for post-conviction 
relief, challenging a guilty plea to murder and felony DUI in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, Grand County, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly rule that the Petition was nearly 
four years too late and, therefore, barred by the one-year statute of limitations 
provided in Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA)? 
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly rule that Petitioner's tardiness in 
filing his Petition was not excused by the PCRA's equitably tolling provision? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Was Petitioner's tardiness excused by an "interests of justice" 
exception, even though the Utah Legislature removed that exception from the PCRA 
in 2008 and the Utah Supreme Court has never recognized the exception to be 
required by the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of Review. "'We review an appeal from an order dismissing or 
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to 
the lower court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, f 55,234 
P.3d 1115,1133 cert, denied, 130 S. Ct. 3450 (2010). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (West 2009) is dispositive and is attached as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS and STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner admitted he killed his live-in girlfriend, Rhonda Rosenbalm, by ' 
running her over with a car. See Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel ("Plea Statement"), R. 66-80, Addendum B. "Rhonda's 
death was a result of my depraved indifference, as described in Utah's murder 
statute." R. 69. 
He also admitted that after striking and killing Rhonda, he crashed into a 
parked truck occupied by a young couple and their baby. Id. 
2 
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Jesse Smith, one of the occupants of the truck, testified that he saw Petitioner 
and Rhonda arguing. R. 50. Smith said the argument escalated and soon Petitioner 
punched Rhonda, then ran her off the road with the car when she tried to flee. Id. 
Smith told his wife: "We need to do somethin'. This is — this is wrong. You know, 
this — this is — doesn't need to happen." Id. Smith honked the truck's horn and he 
and his wife motioned Rhonda to take refuge in the truck. Id. at 51. 
Rhonda ran towards them, but before she could reach the truck, Petitioner 
struck her with the car again at speeds Smith estimated at 75-80 miles per hour. Id. 
Petitioner then crashed into Smith's truck. Id. The impact pushed the truck 
over a cliff and, Petitioner admits, "could have caused the death of or serious bodily 
injury to the people in the truck . . ." Id. 
According to Smith, the impact "spun us out and pushed us off of a - about a 
50-foot embankment, ah, which stopped on a tree. But if it wouldn't, we would 
have —you know, wouldn't be here today." Id. 
Once his truck came to rest against the tree, Smith ran back up the 
embankment to find Rhonda's body in the middle of the road. Id. Smith knew 
Rhonda was dead because "she was missin' parts and, you know, she was pretty 
mangled up from that." Id. 
Petitioner admitted — and toxicology results showed — that his blood alcohol 
level was more than double the legal limit for driving a car. Id. (citing Utah Code 
3 
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Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) (West 2009)). He also admitted that he had two prior DUI's 
in Texas in the last 10 years and that he was legally prohibited from driving at all. 
Id. at52. 
Petitioner was charged inter alia with one count of murder (domestic 
violence), a first-degree felony; three counts of attempted murder, each a second-
degree felony; one count of aggravated assault (domestic violence), a third-degree 
felony; driving under the influence of alcohol (third offense), a third-degree felony; 
and two counts of assault (domestic violence), class B misdemeanors. Information, 
dated August 16,2004 ("Information"), R. 59-63. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner admitted to murder and DUI. Plea 
Statement, R. 67-68. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State dismissed the 
remaining charges and agreed to take no position on sentencing. R. 73-74. 
Petitioner was sentenced to a mandatory five-years-to-life sentence on the 
murder charge and zero to five years for DUI. Judgment and Order of 
Commitment, dated May 31, 2005 ("Sentence"), R. 83-84. The trial court ordered 
that the sentences run consecutively. R. 84. 
Petitioner did not appeal. 
1 
On March 18,2010, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R. 3-
18. 
4 
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The post-conviction court dismissed the Petition, ruling that it was barred by 
the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. Order, dated February 
24,2011, R. 127-29 ("the Order"), Addendum C 
Petitioner timely appealed. ~ 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Petitioner missed the deadline for post-conviction relief by nearly 
four years. Accordingly, the post-conviction court properly ruled that Petitioner's 
claims are time-barred. 
Point II: The post-conviction court properly ruled that Petitioner's tardiness 
in pursuing post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance against his attorney 
could not be excused by the equitable tolling exception to the one-year statute of 
limitations. 
Point III: Petitioner's claim that his tardiness is excused by an "interests of 
justice" exception fails because the Utah Legislature removed the "interests of 
justice" exception to the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations and the Utah 
Supreme Court has never recognized the exception to be required by the Utah 
Constitution. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
PETITION BECAUSE IT WAS NEARLY FOUR YEARS TOO LATE. 
The post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petition because it was 
almost four-years too late. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") establishes a one-year statute of 
limitations for post-conviction claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (West 2009). 
Under the PCRA, petitioner's cause of action accrued on June 30, 2005 — 30 days 
after he was sentenced and the last day for filing an appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-107(2)(a) and Utah R. App. P. 4. Thus, to be timely, the Petition should have 
been filed by June 30,2006. Because petitioner did not file his Petition until March 
18,2010—nearly four years too late—the post-conviction court correctly dismissed 
the Petition as time-barred. 
6 
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II. 
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
PETITIONER'S TARDINESS IN FILING HIS PETITION WAS 
NOT EXCUSED BY THE EQUITABLE TOLLING EXCEPTION. 
On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in not 
granting his petition because his attorney, Andrew Fitzgerald,1 was ineffective for 
not considering possible defenses that could have been raised based on Petitioner's 
"highly intoxicated state" and his bipolar disorder, which Petitioner claims could 
have negated the mens rea needed to commit his crimes. Aplt. Br. at 1,12. Petitioner 
also claims that his attorney lured him into pleading guilty by promising him that 
he would serve less time in prison. Id. at 1, 12-13. Petitioner concedes that he 
learned his counsel had advised him incorrectly "[a]fter serving several months in 
prison/' Id. at 4. 
The post-conviction court properly ruled that Petitioner's ineffective 
assistance claims were time-barred because he either knew or should have known of 
the claims years before he filed his post-conviction petition on March 19,2009. "The 
court is fully convinced that Cunningham knew, or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known, long before March 1[9], 2009, of all the issues he 
raises in the Petition." Order at 4 (Addendum C). 
1
 Fitzgerald is currently serving as Grand County Attorney. Happy Morgan 
was the county attorney in 2005 when Petitioner entered his guilty plea. 
7 
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In amending the time-bar provisions of the PCRA, the Legislature did not 
eliminate all exceptions for a late filing. Rather, it replaced the "interests of justice" 
exception with a tolling provision. That provision tolls the one-year period "for any 
period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state 
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental 
incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). As written, amended 107 will time-
bar a claim only when a petitioner fails to pursue it with reasonable diligence and 
free of obstructions by unconstitutional state action or mental or physical 
impairment. Petitioner fails to even allege that he meets the requirements for tolling 
the one-year time limit. 
Amended section 107 generally tracks the federal limitations statute, which 
requires a petitioner to file within one year, but includes provisions to account for 
later discovered evidence and unconstitutional state action that prevents a timely 
filing. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).2 It appears that "[e]very court which has addressed 
the issue — i.e., whether, as a general matter § 2244(d) constitutes an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ—has concluded that it does not." Wyzyowski v. Dept. of 
2
 Amended section 107 actually is more generous in that it also tolls the one 
year limitation period when a petitioner cannot file due to mental or physical 
incapacity. Section 2244 includes no similar provision relief. 
8 
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Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213,1217 (11th Cir. 2000). Petitioner cites no authority and 
provides no analysis as to why the Utah Constitution requires a different result. 
For the reasons argued, Petitioner has not shown that the post-
conviction court erred in applying the time bar or that amended section 107 is 
unconstitutional. 
III. 
PETITIONER'S TARDINESS IN FILING HIS PETITION WAS 
NOT EXCUSED BY AN "INTERESTS OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION. 
Petitioner has never disputed that his Petition is nearly four years too late. 
Rather, he claims, first, that the PCRA's time-bar is unconstitutional because it 
has no provision excusing tardiness in "the interests of justice/7 Aplt. Br. at 6. 
Second, he claims that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting Petitioner's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. at 1. 
Petitioner is incorrect because the post-conviction court correctly held that the 
Utah Supreme Court has never constitutionalized the "interests of justice" 
exception. "This court agrees with the State that the Utah Supreme Court has not 
invalidated any and all limitation periods for post-conviction petitions. Some 
statutory bard withstand constitutional scrutiny and must be upheld." Order at 2. 
The Utah Constitution does not give a convicted person the right to have a 
conviction reviewed for constitutional error in a post-conviction proceeding or 
9 
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prohibit the Legislature from regulating post-conviction review. The 2008 
legislative amendments to the time-bar provision contain no "interests of justice" 
exception; rather the new statute only time-bars post-conviction claims that a 
petitioner fails to pursue with reasonable diligence and unobstructed by 
unconstitutional state action. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. Petitioner has not 
shown that he has a constitutional right to broader access to post-conviction review. 
A. The Utah Supreme Court Has Made Clear That The 
Judiciary Will Review Post-Conviction Proceedings Within 
The Parameters Of The PCRA. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the power to review post-conviction 
petitions '[qjuintessentially . . . belongs to the judicial branch of government.'" 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42 \ 17,94 P.3d 263 (quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 
1033 (Utah 1989) (discussing the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in the Utah 
constitution)). In reliance on that conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned 
that "'the legislature may not impose restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief] 
as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the constitution.'" Gardner, 
2004 UT 42, \ 17 (citation omitted). 
But Utah Supreme Court precedent does not render the restrictions contained 
in the amended time-bar provisions unconstitutional. To the contrary, the Utah 
Supreme Court, through its rule making authority, has determined that the judiciary 
will exercise its constitutional power over post-conviction cases within the confines 
10 
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of the PCRA, which includes amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. 
In 2010, the Utah Supreme Court amended Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Rule 65C(a) 
now provides that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which a person 
may challenge the validity of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction 
and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal/7 Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (2010). 
The Advisory Committee Notes state that the rule amendments "embrace Utah's 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief." They 
continue that "[i]t is the committee's view that the added restrictions which the Act 
places on post-conviction petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus." 
By itself, rule 65C(a) defeats Petitioner's constitutional challenge. 
B. The Utah Supreme Court Has Not Constitutionalized The 
"Interests Of Justice" Exception and Petitioner Has Not 
Otherwise Shown That Amended Section 107 Is 
Insufficiently Flexible To Meet Constitutional 
Requirements. 
Relying primarily on Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), Petitioner argues 
that the Utah Supreme Court has held that a post-conviction time-bar statute that 
does not include an "interests of justice" exception is unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Aplt. Br. at 8. Petitioner is incorrect. 
When the Julian court analyzed the "interests of justice" exception in a one-
year limitations statute that preceded the PCRA, it rejected the State's argument that 
11 
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the statutory language should be narrowly construed. The court held that reaching 
the merits of a meritorious post-conviction claim always would be in the "interests 
of justice." Julian, 966 P.2d at 253-54. 
It is true that the Julian court commented "that no statute of limitations may 
be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Id. at 254. However, mat 
language was not controlling because Julian did not "directly challenge" the time-
bar's constitutionality, and the supreme court granted relief on the basis of statutory 
construction. Id.; see Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96 f 3, 976 P.2d 100 (recognizing 
that the comment about the constitutionality of a limitations statute was dicta only); 
see also Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 If 9,123 P.3d 400 (recognizing the principle that 
the court should not reach a constitutional issue when it can resolve an issue on 
statutory grounds); Specter Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,105 (1944) ("If 
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of 
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable"). 
After Julian, the supreme court next considered the "interests of justice" 
language in Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). Unlike Julian, Frausto directly 
challenged the time-bar's constitutionality. Id. at 851. The Frausto plurality author 
quoted his language from Julian that "'no statute of limitations may be 
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition.'" Id. (Russon,}., with one justice 
12 
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concurring). However, that opinion did not carry a majority. Two justices 
concurred only in the result, id. at 851 — i.e., that a court must always consider the 
statutory "interests of justice" exception—and one wrote separately that he 
"disagree[d] with the main opinion's holding that 'a petitioner's failure to comply 
with a statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a 
habeas corpus petition/" Id. at 852; see also Swart, 1999 UT App 96, f 3 (recognizing 
that the language at issue did not carry a majority).3 
Finally, in Adams, the Utah Supreme Court again relied on its interpretation of 
the statutory "interests of justice" language. Adams, 2005 UT 62, | f 8-9,14-15. In 
fact, the court expressly declined to address Adams' constitutional challenge to the 
time-bar because it resolved the case on statutory grounds. Id. at f 9. 
Thus, despite Petitioner's claims to the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has 
never held that a time-bar to a post-conviction claim would be unconstitutional 
without an "interests of justice" exception. Petitioner wholly fails to address how 
amended section 107 lacks sufficient flexibility to meet constitutional standards even 
3Even the Frausto plurality seemed to recognize that its constitutional 
language in Julian was not controlling. The court stated, "While we did not address 
the constitutionality of section 78-35a-107 in Julian, we clearly stated that proper 
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas petition will always be in the 
interests of justice." 
13 
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without an exception titled "interests of justice."4 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted February f (a 2012, » 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
<UytV5T) .OPd^r 
BRETT J. DELPQjfro 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
4
 Petitioner recites language from Julian suggesting that legislatively imposed 
time limits are a "violation of the separation of powers and the open courts 
provision of the Declaration of Rights." Aplt. Br. at 9; see also Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 
249, 253 (Utah 1998). Because Petitioner has failed to properly develop these 
arguments, his mere mention of them constitutes inadequate briefing and this Court 
should not consider them. "Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
'requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority.'" Helbach v. State, 2009 UT App 375U 
(Memorandum Decision) (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998)); see 
also State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah 1998) ("Inadequately briefed arguments 
would not be considered on appeal from conviction"); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 
170, t 13, 72 P.3d 138 (issue inadequately briefed when the overall analysis is so 
lacking "as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). 
14 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates: 
• (a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is 
taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is 
taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition 
for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established. 
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a 
petition due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental 
incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner 
is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3). 
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting: 
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303: or 
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401. 
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this 
section. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 1171. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 288. § 6. eff. Mav 5. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 358. § 
1. eff May 5. 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 288, § 6, added subsec. (2)(f) and rewrote subsec. (3) which formerly read: 
"(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file 
within the time limitations." 
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 1, inserted subsec. (4) and redesignated subsec. (4) as subsec. (5). 
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Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1171, 
Laws 2008, c. 288, § 6 and Laws 2008, c. 358, § 1. 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1979, c. 133. 
Laws 1995, c. 82, § 1. 
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 7. 
Laws 2004, c. 139, §2. 
C. 1953, §78-35a-107. 
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HAPPY J. MORGAN, # 7586 
Grand County Attorney 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, UT 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-1326 
PATRICK B. NOLAN, # 2422 
Assistant Attorney General 
5272 S. College Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, UT 84123 
Telephone: (801)281-1200 
Attorneys for The State of Utah 
-^*<&!fc-County 
u-o APR 1 9 2005, 
Ct£ll jCO?7H-
• g y 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
RICKY JAMES CUNNINGHAM, JR., 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 041700155 FS 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
I, Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised 
of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes: 
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Crimes & Statutory 
Provisions 
Murder, U.C.A. § 76-5-203 
(Domestic Violence) 
Degree 
First Degree 
Felony 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Maximum: 5 years to life; $10,000 
fine. Minimum: mandatory 
commitment to prison (not eligible 
for probation). 
Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol (Two or More Prior 
Convictions within 10 Years), 
U.C.A. §41-6-44(6) 
Third Degree Maximum: 0 - 5 years in prison; 
Felony $5,000.00 fine. Minimum (if placed 
on probation): mandatory 1,500 
hours in jail; fine not less than 
$1,500.00. 
I have received a copy of the Amended Information filed against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes to which I am 
pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are: 
COUNT 1: MURDER (Domestic Violence). 
1. On or about August 10, 2004, in Grand County, Utah, 
2. The defendant, Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., 
EITHER: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Rhonda Rosenbalm; 
OR, 
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(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that caused the death of Rhonda Rosenbalm; 
OR, 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby caused the death of Rhonda 
Rosenbalm; and 
3. Rhonda Rosenbalm and I were cohabitants, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1. 
COUNT 6: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
1. On or about August 10, 2004, in Grand County, Utah, 
2. The defendant, Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., did operate or was in actual physical control, of 
a vehicle while having sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test showed that 
he had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test. 
3. The defendant has two or more prior convictions within ten (10) years of this offense. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. I want to plead guilty to Count 1 by admitting that the third alternative (element 2(c) 
above) describes what I did. I do not wish to admit that I killed Rhonda Rosenbalm intentionally 
or knowingly; nor that I intended to cause serious bodily injury to her. I understand that if I 
admit that I killed her under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, 
under Utah law, that constitutes murder. I admit and claim that the following facts describe my 
conduct. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas, and prove the 
elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty: 
« 0000 
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Defendant's Factual Statement 
On or about August 10, 2004, Rhonda Rosenbalm and I drove from Grand Junction, 
Colorado to Moab, Utah in her 1983 Buick Riviera. The car had just been tuned up that 
morning. Since it was a hot summer afternoon, when we arrived in town, we went to Woody's 
bar and spent the afternoon drinking beer. Later that evening, we stopped at Wendy's for a 
hamburger, and then drove out to Arches National Park. 
When we got to a turnout on top, we began to argue. Rhonda got out of the car. I hit her 
twice and ran her off the road with the car. There was a flat-bed truck parked at the turnout with 
three (3) people, a young couple and their baby, in the cab. I drove on up the road and turned 
around. I then drove back down the hill at a very high rate of speed, crossing into the wrong 
lane, and then ran into Rhonda, who was on the far left side of the road. The car then ran into the 
truck and pushed it over the edge of the cliff. Rhonda's car then burst into flames. 
I admit that my conduct evidences a depraved indifference to human life, and that I 
knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to Rhonda, thereby causing 
her death. I also acknowledge the following: that I was driving the 1983 Buick Riviera, when I 
was prohibited by law from driving any motor vehicle because I had no driver's license; that I 
had been drinking all afternoon, and that I was intoxicated; and that my actions caused the death 
of Rhonda Rosenbalm, and could have caused the death of or serious bodily injury to the people 
in the truck which I hit and pushed over the edge of the cliff. 
Rhonda's death was a result of my depraved indifference, as described in Utah's murder 
statute. 
4 - 0001 
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I understand that this is my version of what happened, and that if I were to be convicted 
by a jury of murder, the jury would not specify which of the alternative mental states they found 
to apply: whether intentional, knowing, intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, or 
acting with depraved indifference. However, it matters to me which alternative I admit. I admit 
that I killed Rhonda in a manner evidencing depraved indifference. I deny that I intentionally or 
knowingly killed Rhonda, or that I intended to cause serious bodily injury to her. 
I admit that my blood alcohol concentration was .20 grams at the scene of the crime. 
I have been previously convicted on at least two occasions of Driving While Intoxicated 
in the State of Texas within the last ten (10) years. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will 
give up all the following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
sendee to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. I certify that I have read this statement and 
that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I 
also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty pleas. 
My attorney is K. Andrew Fitzgerald. My attorney and I have fully discussed this 
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statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty pleas. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury. I also understand that if I ask to have the judge decide the case instead of a jury, 
if the prosecution and the judge agree to that, then my case would be decided by an impartial 
judge. I will be giving up the right to trial by either judge or jury by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me; and b) 
my attorney, or if I waived my right to an attorney, I would myself, have the opportunity to cross-
examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses if 
I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay 
those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that 
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I 
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes. If I choose to 
fight the charges against me, I need only plead unot guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At 
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before I could be convicted. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be 
admitting that I committed the crimes stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence, I must 
file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentences that may be imposed for the crimes 
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to any crime that carries a 
mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I 
know my sentence must include a prison term, and may also include a fine. I understand by 
pleading guilty to murder I will not be eligible for probation, meaning that commitment to prison 
is mandatory for an indeterminate term of at least 5 years, and which may be for life. 
I know that in addition to any fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victims of my crimes, 
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of this plea 
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agreement. 
I also understand that I am pleading guilty to an offense that is classified as a domestic 
violence offense. Wliile that does not enhance the penalty for this offense, I understand that if I 
am convicted of another domestic violence offense within five years, that subsequent domestic 
violence offense might be enhanced by raising the offense and punishment by one degree, 
pursuant to U.C.A. §77-36-1.1. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. 
I also know if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty 
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences, unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences 
would be inappropriate. 
Plea agreement. My guilty pleas are the result of a plea agreement between myself and 
the prosecuting attorneys. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, 
are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
Upon the Court's acceptance of the guilty pleas as noted above, 
1. The State will move to dismiss all other counts set forth in the Amended Information, 
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effective thirty (30) days after sentencing. 
2. I will pay Court-ordered restitution for Rhonda's funeral expenses, in the amount 
determined by the Department of Corrections. 
3. I will pay Court-ordered restitution to Jesse Smith, in the amount determined by 
the Department of Corrections. 
4. I understand that if the judge accepts my pleas of guilty, that Utah law requires that I 
be sentenced to prison for an indeterminate term of five years to life, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-406, for the crime of murder. 
5. The prosecutors will take no position with respect to the imposition of consecutive 
sentences or fines by the Court at the time of sentencing. 
Trial judge not bound. 
I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or 
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charge for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the judge. I also know that any 
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the 
judge. 
I also understand that a sentence of an indeterminate term of imprisonment from five 
years to life is mandatory and is required by law in this case. 
0 
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering these pleas of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those 
contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 26 years of age. I have attended school through the 11th grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently 
under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my pleas. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilt}/ pleas, I must file a written motion 
to withdraw my pleas before sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my 
pleas upon leave of the court, if I show that they were not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
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I understand that any challenge to my pleas made after sentencing must be pursued under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 19th day of April 2005. 
H. 
ti9kyJ R c^  James Cunninglytm, Jr. 
DEFENDANT / 
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Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Ricky James Cunningham, Jr., the defendant, and that I 
know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him. I have discussed it with him and 
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents, and is mentally and physically 
competent. I affirmatively state that I have no question concerning the defendant's competency. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crimes and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and 
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
K. ANDREW FITZG^RALD^ 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. 8944 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorneys 
We certify that we are the attorneys for the State of Utah in the case against Ricky James 
Cunningham, Jr., defendant. We have reviewed this Statement of Defendant. We agree that the 
defendant's claims which form the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct, when combined 
with his claimed mens rea, constitute one form of the crime of murder to which he is pleading guilty. 
We also agree that the facts which he claims (as distinguished from his mental state) are true. We 
believe that the evidence of his mens rea, when combined with Hie facts, supports a plea of guilty, 
and constitutes the offense of murder under Utah law. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage this plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement, or are as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for 
the offenses for which these pleas are entered; and that since a jury would not return a verdict that 
distinguishes between the mens rea alternative elements in this case on the charge of murder, the 
acceptance of these pleas would serve the public interest. 
>PY J. MORGAN PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Grand County Attorney Assistant Attorney General 
Bar No. 7586 Bar No. 2422 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement, and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that the defendant's guilty pleas are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this day of April, 2005. 
COURT: 
m r^lutji^ „ . LANDERSON 
S ^ S T ® ^ ^ T R I C T COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 041700155 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME . 
Mail K ANDREW FITZGERALD 
ATTORNEY DEF 
55 E 100 S 
MOAB, UT 84532 
Mail HAPPY J MORGAN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
125 E CENTER 
MOAB UT 84532 
Mail PATRICK B. NOLAN 
ATTY 
5272 S COLLEGE DRIVE 
SUITE 200 
MURRAY UT 84123 
Dated this^^^^aay of 20 0^ 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL 
APPEALS 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
PILED 
FEB 2 4 2011 
GRAND COUNTY 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GR&N&-Ci2iajTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY JAMES CUNNINGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants, 
ORDER 
Case No, 100700055 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Petitioner Ricky James Cunningham ("Cunningham") filed his 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief and for Writ of Hapeas Corpus 
(the "Petition") on March 18, 2010. This court ordered a 
response from the State of Utah (the "State") on May 12, 2010. 
The State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief (the "Motion") on July 16, 
2010. Cunningham filed his Opposition to State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on July 30, 2010. The State filed State's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on August 
19, 2010. On December 20, 2010, Cunningham filed Petitioner's 
Response to State's Motion for Summary Judgment and on February 
18, 2011, Cunningham filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Cunningham pled guilty on April 19, 2005, to Murder and to 
felony DUI. Cunningham signed a Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Pleas and Certificate of Counsel (the 
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"Defendant's Statement") which included a detailed description of 
what Cunningham had done. He admitted he had engaged in conduct 
that created a grave risk of death to his girlfriend, Rhonda 
Rosenbalm. He admitted that his conduct evidenced a depraved 
indifference to human life. On May 31, 2005, Cunningham was 
sentenced to five years to life, and up to five years, in the 
Utah State Prison, to be served consecutively. 
Cunningham maintains in his Petition that his trial counsel 
was constitutionally deficient because 1) counsel misstated how 
long Cunningham would spend in prison, 2) counsel failed to 
investigate the effect of Cunningham's intoxication on his mental 
state, and 3) counsel failed to investigate the effect of 
Cunningham's bipolar disorder on his mental state. The Motion 
does not address these claims, but raises instead the statutory 
bar of section 78B-9-107, Utah Code, which bars claims of which 
"petitioner knew or should have know in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence" at least one year before the Petition was 
filed. 
This court agrees with the State that the Utah Supreme Court 
has not invalidated any and all limitation periods for post-
conviction petitions. Some statutory bars withstand 
constitutional scrutiny and must be upheld. Section 107 purports 
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to bar all claims of which Cunningham knew, or should have known, 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, by March 19, 2009, one 
year before Cunningham filed the Petition. This date is almost 
four years after Cunningham was sentenced. 
The issue of intoxication is not new in this case. In fact, 
Cunningham specifically admitted having been intoxicated on 
August 10, 2004, the date of his crimes. And, while this court 
recalls no discussion of Cunningham's bipolar disorder in his 
appearance before the court, Cunningham himself was clearly aware 
of his bipolar diagnosis. While the court does not expect the 
accused in any case to be an expert on alcohol intoxication or 
mental illness, the court believes from its own experience that 
virtually every person who appears before the court is aware that 
alcohol impairment and impairment from mental illness are issues 
that may affect culpability and punishment. There is no 
reasonable likelihood that Cunningham was oblivious to these 
issues between August 10, 2004, and March 18, 2009. 
With respect to the claim that trial counsel misstated the 
likely period of Cunningham's incarceration., this court notes 
that the Defendant's Statement clearly states that Cunningham 
could be incarcerated for five years to life, plus up to five 
more years. This court also reminded Cunningham during the plea 
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colloquy of this possible consequence. And if Cunningham had any 
doubts about who would set the limits of his incarceration, he 
would quickly have learned the truth within a few months of 
entering the Utah State Prison. 
The court is thus fully convinced that Cunningham knew, or 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, long 
before March 18, 2009, of all of the issues he raises in the 
Petition. The Motion is therefore granted and the Petition is 
hereby denied. 
This is the order of the court. No further order is 
required. 
Dated this day of February, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100700055 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: BRETT J DELPORTO 160 E 300 S 6TH FLR POB 140854 SALT LAKE 
CITY, UT 84114-0854 
MAIL: JENNIFER K GOWANS PO BOX 982047 PARK CITY UT 84098-2047 
Date: Z\H\10n X$b£ "p/CATj 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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